

# The Emotions as the Authentic Voices of a Human Life

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## Part 1

The development of a new kind of psychology called “discursive psychology”, and its new cousin called “positioning theory”, has to a large extent been inspired by the writings of the later Wittgenstein. There is as yet no paradigmatic or canonical formulation of the new psychology, partly because it is still in the making, and partly because its proponents have different philosophical backgrounds. The grandfathers of discursive psychology were the so called ethnomethodologist Harold Garfinkel and the sociologist Erwin Goffmann. The father of discursive psychology is the philosopher of science Rom Harré, and there is as yet no clear indication which of his pupils and colleagues will become prominent figures within the discursive psychology of tomorrow.

In discursive psychology there are three senses in which to address our Human Being. It is the first of these senses which defines the approach of discursive psychology (from now on DP). In this first sense we find that the use of certain linguistic terms, especially the personal pronouns, is constitutive for whom we are. The use of language is seen as forming the general resource and platform from where all our intersubjective activities spring to the effect of a gradual build up of roles, functions, structures, and positions within the intersubjective Arena. By contrast to most other forms of sociology, discursive psychology underscores the tight relation between the expressive and the descriptive uses of words, even if it also underscores in this respect the primacy of expression.

The general theme in relation to this first aspect of DP is how one learns to express oneself to the effect that one can be recognized as a certain kind of social agent, or *Person*. However, it is important to acknowledge that this aspect must be related to two other senses of “Self”. First, we shall acknowledge the “nature” or “reality” of Persons: social agents have powers, capabilities, or capacities by means of which they manage to behave and express themselves as they do. And these powers are first of all, according to DP, exercised in order to learn to make use of a long set of tools. The ability to find, to construct, and to make use of tools is crucial for our becoming competent social agents. DP even regards the body and its parts as such tools. Especially, DP regards the Brain as being, merely, a tool for the exercise of intentional behaviour. The Brain does not cause action, but action requires the use of the Brain.

However, DP would be nothing but a certain methodology if it did not include the third aspect of our Human Being, namely the characteristic feature that individual people gradually come to possess, and react to, what can be called a *Sense of Self*. The individual Person sees herself not only as answering to certain general concepts (like being a woman, being a mother, being a European, being a customer ammo...) She comes to think of herself as a *special* woman, a special mother, a special European, and special customer. Let us ask, *how* that is possible (not “why” it is possible or necessary)? The answer given by DP is that the possibility of adopting certain positions and roles within the intersubjective Arena must be associated with the emergence, and managing, of a variety of *emotions*. It is the way in which my positioning myself towards others involves say, sorrow, shame, pride, anger, anxiety etc. that shows, to myself, that I am not just anybody, any teacher, but a special teacher.

We now have three aspects of being oneself on the table. In the right ontological order we have, first, the characterization of people as embodied powers that manage to construct and make use of various tools, including parts of their bodies. Second, we have the ability to engage in

intersubjective intercourse as a social agent or Person by means of, not the least, verbal expressions. Finally we have the criterion of being a mature individual; the criterion of having developed a certain, adequate Sense of Self. These three aspects cannot be dissociated from one another, and thus we must warn against certain misunderstandings that might arise: The view that people embody powers does not express a reductive naturalistic nor animalistic view to the effect that we postulate occurring causal processes behind every kind of conscious activity. We are talking about a feature of human existence which in the language of German phenomenology is called *Sein-können*. We are talking about the straightforward idea that to exist as a human being means to be able to pick an apple, plant the seeds, to eat, walk, speak, sing, drive a car, read a book etc.

Our second reminder is that social agency is not merely a matter of conforming to norms, rules, values and the like. It is not merely what Frankfurt scholars and others have wanted to teach us to the effect that social agency is all about upholding and developing a human lifeworld. This upholding is already more, in that it is a way in which people uphold and develop a variety of ways of dealing with and understanding natural phenomena.

Our final reminder is that the sense of Self in no way constitutes something called “self-awareness” or “self-understanding”, or “self-determination”. The Self about which Charles Taylor and all the other neo-Hegelians are talking, is non-existent.

There is no way in which my awareness of myself, *as such*, is a constitutive factor in my personal endeavours. My Sense of Self is not a kind of regulative principle to the effect that my attitudes and dispositions towards certain values, goods, or norms is fuelled. My Sense of Self is just as confused, full of tension, and under attack as I move on in my life than all the other inclinations, associations, recollections, or reflective thoughts that happen to influence my further behaviour.

The important thing is simply *the fact of there being* a Sense of Self. [I am aware that I smashed the intruder on the jaw, and that I gave the children some candy, and thus that it was not my brother who did so. I am aware that I was anxious to hit the intruder, that I afterwards felt a little shameful, although I later took some pride in the action.]. My taking stock of the situation, and the things I thereafter set myself to do, consequently carry a number of expressive features. My presence and my further participation in various occupations carry with them signs of *my being engaged* in matters of issue. I think this is the first conclusion I want to draw: DP place the focus on the presence of people” within various positions and situations of social intercourse. By talking in this sense of the “presence” of people, we do not refer to the way in which people are, as it were, present to themselves. We simply, and merely, underscore that the presence of people is a real, inescapable part of the given positions and situations. The presence of people is part of Reality, it is a *Wirkung within* the situation, not an onlookers awareness *of* the situation.

I will not try to assess how, and how much of, all this is in line with the thoughts of Wittgenstein himself. I will only make a few remarks on that.

First remark is the fact that Wittgenstein did indeed in his later writings on psychology indicate a naturalistic aspects of human existence. He explicitly talks about what he called “life-expressions” (*Lebensäußerungen*). Such expressions, and other more immediate reactions and dispositions belong to our Human Form of Life. Next remark is that Wittgenstein would agree with DP in that human behaviour always includes relations to natural phenomena, not the least to what Wittgenstein calls *Anlässe*, those facts and affairs that trigger someone’s behaviour in certain situations. Our situation as Persons is never conceived purely sociological but always with an eye on certain natural phenomena.

Final remark concerns the notion of a Sense of Self: Wittgenstein develops a sophisticated notion of “pretence” to the effect that whenever a person is acting in some way, that person deliberately engages in *some form* of pretence. This is a dramaturgical view on action. It points to a parallel between social action and play acting and underscores the *strategic* dimension of all action. In Wittgenstein there is, in general, no sharp divide between communicative action and strategic action.

If we put the remarks just made together, we should ask how the more spontaneous life-expressions and the strategic part of action go together; and that is precisely a main theme in Wittgenstein’s later writings; namely the way in which life-expressions put a limit to certain forms of play acting. This is for instance exactly why he wrote so intensively on the phenomenon of “the dawning of an aspect”: The phenomenon of the dawning of an aspect is characterized by the fact that such dawning must involve some kind of surprise and give rise to some sort of wonder. In this way, the experience of the dawning will by necessity be accompanied by a number of expressions; one stares, or holds one’s breath or one makes characteristic sounds and gestures. Concerning all this, the phenomenon of the dawning of an aspect is interesting because here, and only in few other cases, there is a strict limit to the possibility of pretence. The platform, the background, or the frame for my further, deliberate action entertains a transformation. After the advent of the dawning I have seen something that I may, and may not, want to share with others in certain ways. The modalities of this further manoeuvring are however not for me to shape and control. The scene is set independently of my willing it, and it is my emotional responses to the dawning that demonstrate to me, and others, that our common situation, as teachers and pupils, as friends or enemies, as collaborators or strangers, *ammo*, has changed.

I conjecture that this is the main theme in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of psychology, namely how intersubjective intercourse always includes a variety of uncertainties concerning the relation to others, including the fact that there is no way that anyone can escape this situation by being honest, sincere, factual, or by following the rules, the norm, and conventions of a given culture. In that sense, privacy, being alone, or being on one’s own is the Human Condition. A basic fact of the Human Form of Life is what Ilham Dilman called our “separateness”. However, by contrast to a Sartrean kind of separateness, where individuals are so to speak, *entirely* on their own in that all efforts for establishing common forms of understanding and practice, according to Sartre, lead to bad faith; for Wittgenstein the situation never gets so bad. There will always be ways in which we can *try to make sense* of each other and our doings. Indeed, this phrase of Peter Winch captures the main spirit of Wittgenstein’s anthropology.

## Part 2

Now, before I return to discuss Wittgenstein, I want to point out an interesting parallel between the general outlook of DP and the way in which Ernst Cassirer adopted some fundamental thoughts of Goethe. I think that there is a lot to say on how Wittgenstein also adopted many themes and concepts from Goethe, but I cannot elaborate on that in the present text.

The way in which Cassirer presents and discusses philosophical issues, and the ambitions of his philosophy, seems on the face of it to be very different from Wittgenstein’s approach. Yet, if we compare Cassirer to other German contemporary writers, one way to mark Cassirer’s difference to these contemporaries would be to claim that he does exactly what Wittgenstein will have philosophers turn to do. Cassirer investigates the actual use of language, of institutions, and traditions in several,

different, cultural settings. Like Wittgenstein he does not want philosophy to develop an explanatory account over and above the already given social practices. Like Wittgenstein, to take one example, Cassirer asks how mathematics might be of help within science, politics, or the arts, rather than asking what is the rationality and foundation of mathematical thought. Indeed, there is no such thought in abstraction from the various social practices, Cassirer and Wittgenstein would agree.

Now, I want to discuss Cassirer's mention and use of the three so-called "Original Phenomena" that Goethe pointed out. Cassirer reformulates, and renames, these phenomena and calls them "basis phenomena". The first such basis phenomenon is our being alive. We are living creatures, and in this respect, our physical energy, biological organisation and development, social power, linguistic competences, and artistic skills are all features of a *human* life. There is no ontologically given form of life (physical, biological, or cultural) to which the Human Form of Life can be reduced. We can only exist in so far as we live the Human Form of Life. The second basis phenomenon is called "action", which for Cassirer always, already involve "ethical action". "Action" is not a practical means that is externally related to our intentions, motives, and reasons. It's the other way around. There can only be said to be intentions, motives, and reasons because we are creatures that act. Action, here, means to be able (and have to be able) to live with others. It is, in German, a matter of *Mit-Wirken*, being able to (and having to be able to) contribute to human affairs. The third basis phenomenon is *work*, more in the sense of an artistic work than in the materialist sense of performing a concrete change of something. "Work" here rather means "deed" or "excellence". Work means a manner of existence in relation to which we can recognize both ourselves and how things stand. "Work" brings us a "World" in which to live. It does not merely bring us a set of products. "Work" brings us a number of possible language games, and not merely a set of elements to be moved within such games.

None of the three basis phenomena count as forms of being. Goethe's phrase was *energeia*, by contrast to specific forms of *ergon*. The basis phenomena are, Cassirer says:

"the windows of our knowledge of Reality, that through which Reality opens up to us.

Basis phenomena do not give us access to external beings that we, with effort, have to "draw into our circle." They are the look that we cast on the world. They are the eye, so to speak, that we open up. In this first opening of the eye the phenomenon "Reality" discloses itself to us." (PSF IV, p 138)

Another way of expressing this view is to link three different figures in philosophy; the idea of being embedded in Nature, the idea of being situated in relation to others, and the idea of awareness. The basis phenomena, then, each in a different way, exemplify a way in which people become aware *by means of* being both embedded and situated.

I want to point to parallels between DP, Cassirer, and two further writers, Merleau-Ponty (MMP) and Heidegger. The major work of MMP, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, is largely misunderstood because interpreters fail to take notice of the programmatic statement that closes the introduction to Part I of the book. MMP here says that:

"we shall take objective thought (and) .... consider it ...at work in the constitution of our body as object, since this is a crucial moment in the genesis of the objective world....And since the genesis of the objective body is only a moment in the constitution of the object, the body - by withdrawing from the objective world - will carry with it the intentional threads linking it to its surrounding and finally reveal to us the perceiving subject as the perceived world" ( PP, p. 72)

A “phenomenology of perception” shall reveal to us how different forms of objectifying our surroundings, different ways of taking stock of our situation, how this intellectual “withdrawal of the body”, already, always involves a sharp focus on the perceiving subject. When we become aware of the world *as a variety of possible organized settings*, then we have already acknowledged a variety of ways in which people manage to orientate themselves and move around within Reality. That is what the metaphor of the body indicates in the writings of MPP. This comes out in the superscript of two famous sections on “the body”, “the body in its sexual being”, and “the body as expression and speech”. “The body” is erotic in that it cannot leave the world, including the body of others, alone. We cannot but try to dance with our surroundings. But this dance is not a goal in itself, it carries with it a number of expressions to the effect that my dancing with things is already a way in which I, and you, become aware of my concerns, interests, plans, hopes, or confusions. Importantly, such expressions do not lay bare a particular Person’s “mentality” or “moods”, instead they reveal how a world is given, a Human World or what MPP calls a “phenomenological world”. The World is disclosed as a space of action. This is the point of the motto “revealing the perceiving subject as the perceived world”.

Now let us compare all this with a crucial notion of Heidegger, that of *Befindlichkeit*: We are told that this notion covers “a form of existence” and that the traditional, metaphysical expression for this form is “mood”, in German *Stimmung*, that is; to be attuned to ones surroundings. A main example of *Befindlichkeit* is the phenomenon of fear. I become aware that a lion is approaching to the effect that my whole life-situation is transformed; my situation has become one of fear: This means that I think and act accordingly. I estimate the distance to the animal, its speed of motion, my possible escape routes and other forms of precautions. My fear is not a state of mind. It is a series of activities and ways of approaching the reality of things. Heidegger mentions two “ontological characteristics” of *Befindlichkeit*:

“Die Befindlichkeit erschließt das Dasein in seiner Geworfenheit und zunächst und zumeist in der Weise der ausweichenden Abkehr ... Sie ist eine existenziale Grundart der *gleichursprünglichen Erschlossenheit* von Welt, Mit-dasein und Existenz, weil diese selbst wesenhaft In-der Welt-sein ist“ (S & Z, p. 136-7)

In this picture, The Human Being (*Dasein*) is thrown into a world it never chose nor wanted, to the effect that *Dasein* turns itself away. This “turning” reveals that *Dasein* is thrown into a world containing significant differences [such as the difference between a cat and a lion, a hammer and a pencil]. The backbone of the way in which *Dasein* “dwells in the world”, as Heidegger would later call it, is consequently the emergence of determinate forms of emotions in association with characteristic expressions and actions. That is the famous Being-in- the-World.

Heidegger explicitly associates this notion of *Befindlichkeit* with Kant’s original notion of Intuition (*Anschauung*): Intuition is for Kant a basic resource of human consciousness. It is the condition for the possibility of approaching a world of things (instead of a disordered stumbling block) and for my being able to do so *by means of* an activity that “comes from me” (namely a synthetically structured perception and cognition). Similarly, *Befindlichkeit* means the basic resource of being always able to approach a world of (inter-related) different things [being aware that the hammer “belongs” to the work place and that the lion does not necessarily belong to my surroundings] and such that I am able to do *by means of* acting according to certain emotional patterns and reactions.

### Part 3

I have now presented four ways of accounting for the general human condition, the ways of DP, Cassirer, MPP, and Heidegger. On my view, they each, in their different ways, struggle to formulate the basic features of a philosophical anthropology where the notions of experience, action, thought, emotion, self-awareness and Reality are seen as the many sides of the same coin. And they each in their different way want to express a view similar to that of Goethe to the effect that *Am Anfang war die Tat*. They struggle to formulate what we can call a post-metaphysical view where the ambition is not to “explain” nor “characterize” what - absolutely - constitutes or is essential to our Human Being. The ambition is instead to formulate a view that can be put to use in the analysis and understanding of a variety of phenomena and thereby block the attempt to search for a “deeper” metaphysical understanding of these phenomena.

I wanted to invoke the anthropology of MPP and Heidegger in order to highlight a certain feature, namely this: We have learnt that to elucidate the Human Form of Life, we must head on acknowledge the intimate relation between the possibility of objectifying our surroundings and certain forms of subjectivity. The positing of an objective world order - a positing that takes place, and only takes place, in and through out practical dealings with things – this positing always involves ways in which individual human beings become embedded and situated. The emergence of a situation *for someone* and a set of circumstances for *anybody* [who happen to have acquired certain skills and experiences] goes hand in hand. As Cassirer put it:

"Subjekt und Objekt (sind) nicht für sich bestehende Wesenheiten, sondern lediglich Momente einer Beziehung. Sie sind nicht selbständige Dinge, sondern Glieder eines Funktionszusammenhanges, eben jenes Zusammenhanges, den wir die empirische Erkenntnis nennen." (Cassirer 1993, p. 214)

There are no subjects and objects, as such. There are functional relations, Cassirer says, that are given in and through the kind of activity we relate to consciousness and experience,. What are these functional relations, we might ask? According to Cassirer that depends on the different forms of experience:

"das Verhältnis zwischen Subjektivität und Objektivität, Individualität und Universalität, ist nicht dasselbe in einer Werke der Kunst als in der Arbeit des Wissenschaftlers (aber) der Kultur der Menschen ist ins gesamt als eine Prozesse der als eine fortschreitende Emanzipation von sich selbst zu verstehen ist.. der Sprache, Die Kunst, der Wissenschaft, alle sind Phasen in diesem Prozesse." (Cassirer 1993, p. 228)

Here I will not discuss in what sense Cassirer is right, and wrong, in dividing human experience into separate sections, or “symbolic forms”, like science, art, myth, technique and “language”. Especially I will not discuss how “language” can be viewed as a special symbolic form in relation to the other such forms. I only want to underscore the view that the relations between objectivity and subjectivity - and thus also the relations between “the individual” and “the general” - entertain a historical-cultural variation (and perhaps change and development). There are no a priori relations between the subjectivity and objectivity.

But what does this really *mean*? What is the claim? If one reads Cassirer’s text on basis phenomena without a prior knowledge of his other works, one gets two surprises. The first is that the three basis phenomena suddenly are associated with the division between “I”, “you” and “it”. The division between “I”, “you”, and “it” rather corresponds to

different perspectives on the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. The three basis phenomena were; life, action, and work. Accordingly we should remind ourselves that life is always an individual matter – a life can only be led by one living creature. However, to lead a life is to engage in certain surroundings. My life has, Cassirer says using the phrase of Von Üexküll, a “functional circuit” (*Funktionskreis*). That is our first kind of relation between subjectivity and objectivity. The second has to do with the effect of normative constraints in relation to my embedding: My relation to others regulate my behaviour towards other things (for example I do not pick the apples in my neighbours garden). The third kind of relation between subjectivity and objectivity is mediated by the works of people and constitutes the “it” [the “3. Person perspective” on my situation].

This relation is given by the “symbolic” character of certain human expressions. This is of course at the heart of Cassirer’s philosophy, and we cannot scrutinize this big issue here. However, and this is our second surprise, the fact that certain expressions become symbols, the possibility of there being signs, letters, schemes, forms, figures, diagrams and the like, all these objective linguistic features are results of ongoing dynamic processes within the Human Imagination. We are referring to what Cassirer, following Kant, calls “monograms of the Imagination”.

This implies that the perceiving subject manages, within the different contexts of experience, to maintain some sort of “constancy” within the subjects understanding of certain things. A main example here is the ability to see distinct colors, another is the ability to spot distinct geometrical forms or physical shapes. I come back to this issue shortly, but let me summarize: the fact of there being objective works is already the possibility of there being an ability to use the subjective Imagination so as to posit certain objective forms. The subjective effort *Form-Setzung* and the objective matter of fact, the work, are two sides of the same coin. All in all, we have now seen how “subjectivity” and “objectivity” belong together, and seen how they belong together in different ways in respect to the three different basis phenomena.

#### **Part 4**

The main argument of this paper concerns the primacy of emotions in relation to feelings. The argument to follow will hinge on a parallel between [on the one hand] the relation between perception and observation and [on the other hand] the relation between feelings and the kind of re-orientations within a Person’s situation that involves a shift within the emotional features of certain matters. It will be a point, that the tight relation between subjectivity and objectivity implies that changes within strictly normatively constrained practices, such as physical experimentation, and thus changes within observational practices in the sciences, also involve emotional developments of the kind just mentioned. Which again reminds us of the relation between epistemology and psychology in relation to the phenomenon of “the dawning of an aspect” as analyzed by Wittgenstein.

As both the German term, *Gemütsbewegung* and the English term “emotion” indicate; emotions help persons to “move on”. Emotions are closely related to what we can call aspirations. Metaphorically speaking, I feel the pain, and that is already hoping that it will be gone tomorrow when I am supposed to play a football game, or I feel the joy of eating this piece of chocolate, which is already hoping I do not harm my health in doing so. Again, feelings are not cold detections; they involve emotional reactions to the situation in which I find myself. And these reactions in a sense color my aspirations. I said that Cassirer’s account of basis phenomena surprisingly led to a series of other issues. However, if one draws upon his discussion in some of his other works, a clear agenda emerges:

In (Cassirer 1997) we find a general discussion of the major different relations between subjectivity and objectivity within various forms of experience [bodily experience, myth, religion, science, and cultural experience in general]. As should be well known, a main example here is the Copenhagen Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics which underscores the relation between subjectivity and objectivity within physical experimentation. Using two phrases from the paper “Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs”, Cassirer demonstrates how the construction and use of physical measures and their corresponding measuring devices includes what he calls “division” and “participation”. In short, the practices of the theoretical experimental sciences involve, and require, a subjective human stance. It is true that Cassirer follows Max Planck in characterizing the development of physics as a “de-anthropomorphization” to the effect that the physical world picture gets more and more detached from the picture of our body and of ordinary doings. Still, the physical world picture cannot be seen as a representation of Reality, as such. There being a physical world picture *means* that some people, the physicists, as the personal beings they are, manage to adopt a certain attitude, a discipline, and a strict kind of normativity. The world as depicted by physics points back to a special kind of social *participation*. However, “participation” comes with “*division*”. It is first of all a point of Cassirer that there is an interesting “division” between science and religion. Both science and religion is a way of extending and changing the tradition of myth. Science and religion each prolong one, and only one, of two different aspects of the former tradition of myth. Our point now is that this characterization of both religion and science involves an assessment of the contrasting *emotional* features of science and religion.

In relation to this, I will stress two things which will be our first step in bringing Cassirer’s and Wittgenstein’s view together. We learnt that the phenomenon of “the dawning of an aspect” always had to come with some emotional reaction. Now we see why. It is not the change, going from A to B, as such, that is emotional. The issue is instead a change *within* the emotional frame associated with certain forms of objective consideration. That is the first link between Cassirer and Wittgenstein. The second concerns the parallel between the two notions of “seeing” and “feeling”.

Cassirer refers extensively to Herman von Helmholtz’s, and others, investigations of specific forms of perception. The main theme, as I see it, is that perceptions - both in the Kantian sense of *Wahrnehmung* and *Vorstellung* - are part of a functional interplay between sensations, imaginations, thoughts, emotions and conceptually mediated reception, an interplay that leads to certain kinds of experience (each characterized by a certain form of intuition, that is “object-relatedness” or structural organization).

The point is that the generation of perceptions is but a means to an end. What matters in experience is not the awareness of the individual perceptions as such, but is rather the way in which their generation plays a role in the *changing forms of embedding* within our surroundings. Perceptions are only what they are in so far as they play a role in dynamic relation between (in my words) “an agent” and “the action-space of an agent”. It is important that Cassirer explicitly connects this view on perception with a characterization of the practices of measurement within physics.

Cassirer actually follows the path of Helmholtz’s program, as formulated in his famous essay “An epistemological view on counting and measuring”.

The practices of counting and measuring by means of rulers, clocks, and scales, are practices of *observation*. “Observation” is only directed towards something because we have in some sense “prepared” the possible objects of observation. This is not just constructivism, it is more like the



view most people know from Wittgenstein's TLP; once we construct a certain net, what we can catch once we throw the net on to the world, differs from what we can catch if we had thrown a different net. No net, no catch, but the nets in themselves are nothing. They do not mirror the world, although the fact *that a certain net leads to a certain catch* tells us something about the world.

The nets we throw are for instance the theories or formulas of physics. What we catch is a set of materials. We distinguish physical objects by means of certain quantitative measures. We learn that the mass-density, the conductivity, the viscosity and so on, in short the so-called *material constants* are different in respect to certain kinds of objects. In that way we learn how to divide the world into different kinds of metals, fluids, gasses and so on. We learn methods for sorting things out, arranging them and collecting them together in various ways. These arrangements are not a mirror of the world, but the fact that we *actually manage to arrange* the world in certain ways, tells us something.

Consequently, perception is a mediation within observation, and observation is all about the formation and maintenance of certain forms of skilled, normatively constraint dealings with real things. In the same way we can say: *Feelings (Empfindungen)* are mediations within experiences (*Erlebnisse*). The way feelings come and go is part of the way in which people re-orientate themselves towards certain kinds of objects. I do not "have" a toothache, it is my eating or my laughing that hurts, and I react accordingly, say, I only consume soups and stop consuming carrots and beef.

Now, at last, let us apply these views to the question in what sense we can talk about particular "feelings"? The superscript for this conference is "feeling and form", which points directly to Cassirer's views. An individual feeling (like pain, anger, cold, taste, approval, contempt, admiration, despair, fear...) is, whatever it is, only *as* a feature of a human situation. The German term "Empfindung" has a connotation to "finding out". To feel something is not just to register, to detect, or take notice of something. It is, I sometimes say, to *consult* the World. "Being in pain" means that something is painful, say when I move my leg, or if I stop concentrating on my work and try to direct my attention specifically to my leg. I must *arrange* the World in order to become aware of a "feeling". Feelings are characteristic features of certain kinds of situation; they are not independently given occurring events. For Cassirer, feelings involve the three basis phenomenon. This is to say that ones feeling something involves an effort to direct ones life, and to try this in the light of both normative constraints and the works of others. I may feel shameful for wanting to have a beer as I lecture, while I can still acknowledge the point of being sober when lecturing and at the same time wonder if some lectures would proceed better if I had a moderate quantum of beer on beforehand. Both Cassirer and Wittgenstein refer to various "atmospheres" within which my occupation with certain things takes place. It is not that I, as such, am in a certain "mood". It is rather that all my dealings with certain things are "moody". To coin a phrase, *we can only feel for what is already moody*.

Wittgenstein had a remark: "One observes in order to see what One would not see if One did not observe" (Wittgenstein 1978, III, § 326). We can rephrase this, and say "One re-orientates oneself in order to feel what One would not feel if One had not re-orientated oneself. For instance, I have for long been angry at someone. I suddenly meet him in the street and decide to try if we can have a friendly chat. As our conversation proceeds, I begin to feel differently about him, say, my critical stance is mixed with some sort of recognition of his temper. Consequently, every time he smiles at me, I feel a kind of warmth, in that our encounter seems to symbolize a positive feature of humanity.

A final parallel between Cassirer and Wittgenstein comes forth in the text "Inhalt und Umfang des Begriffs". Here Cassirer discusses what in general can be said about the relation between perception and conceptualization. He points out that the formation of concepts, and in

general the formation of general schemes for organizing perceptions is not part of a process of [Lockean] abstraction. The subsumption of individual cases under general concepts is not a matter of finding the essentials behind the appearance of the individual cases, it is instead a matter of learning to cast a *sharper look at particulars*. We can use the phrase of Cora Diamond in her characterization of Wittgenstein's analysis of the rule-governed use of concepts, "attention to particulars". Consequently, when we learn to cast a general look at things, say, in terms of colors, shapes, densities, or movements; our attention is sharpened in respect to specific interests we have in the objects in question. The employment of the general schemes goes hand in hand with a sense for the possible applications of the objects to which the schemes are employed. The possibility of a formal account of, and schematic approach to, something informs me about a possible application of that something, say, in building a house or cooking a meal. The fact that I can *model* a certain item paves the way for a new variety of dealings with that object.

Recall, this new variety of options, which the formal approach founds, involves emotional and personal features, and by setting myself to deal differently with certain things, I transform my entire emotional presence. I do not go from one mood to another. It is the way in which things appear "moody" that change. What triggers or blocks my laughter, my frowns, my sighs, my staring, or my gestures in general, has changed. The spatio-temporal patterns associated with my dealings have been transformed. I move quickly, or hesitate, I am careful or sloppy, in ways that I wasn't before the change.

## Part 5

I have now used parts of Cassirer's, Wittgenstein's, Heidegger's, and MPP's anthropology in order to elucidate what, in my presentation of DP, I called the "presence of people". We have seen how the presence of people not the least is given by the way in which they deal with things in a schematic, operational manner, or in general conditioned by normative constraints. The presence of people is not like a state of mind, it is instead an ongoing re-organization of patterns of attention in association with shifts in the dispositions and conditions of the agents involved. The presence of people involves a manifestly expressed Sense of Self which shows itself in the patterns of emotion associated with a given set of *re-orientations* in our dealings with things. I will now try to make a final elaboration of this view by invoking the cousin to DP, called *Positioning Theory* (from now on PT) and by using Wittgenstein to formulate some requirements that examples of this theory as yet do not meet properly.

The idea behind PT is that the sociological views of Harold Garfinkel and Erwin Goffmann, the conjunction of which Harré and his collaborators for many years called "The Explanation of Social Behaviour" - and which provides a method for analysing social behaviour on a "macro level" in terms of roles and rules that govern given social settings - can be supplemented by a more sophisticated Wittgensteinian analysis of "micro sociological" dynamic encounters between individual people. DP is thus seen as a preliminary framework for "the explanation of social behaviour". The most prominent example of the latter is Harré's analysis of football hooligans in the UK. Harré suggested that one could view the various groups of hooligans as a modern form of *Tribe*, such that the activities of the group were regulated by a "chief", some lower level "commanders" and finally the individual "indians", all in relation questions of honour, self-expression, self-positioning, and recognition of enemies, contestants, and collaborators. This analysis actually helped the police in the UK to infiltrate and stop the violent activities of several groups of hooligans. But why did this or that person become the chief? Why were certain other groups seen as enemies or collaborators, and why was football a suitable arena for

hooliganism? These are the issues of micro sociology that DP can help answer. Accordingly,

the main thesis of PT is that social intercourse is mediated by an ongoing “positioning” of the participating individuals. There are no *given* roles and rules before the actual encounter are initiated, to the effect that the generation of roles and rules is an integral part of the encounter, as such. The generation and maintenance of roles and rules does consequently involve a whole range of *expressive* features that mark how each participant is able and willing to play a role in the joint activities. In short, human behaviour is accompanied by *the fact of there being for each participant a Sense of Self*. We do not just have “activities plus participants”, we have agents that act as persons in order to bring forth the fact that their participation makes a significant difference. We have people who are not only able and willing to do something, but who are also interested in showing why, what can be done, matters, and why it matters who performs the various activities.

Indeed, that was precisely what Goethe according to Goethe turned “social” behaviour (*Sittlichkeit*) into a *cultural knowledge*, within which people know why its worth doing what we do. And the mark for such cultural knowledge is not the least that people are *at one with themselves* in their doings, and that again means, first of all, that *emotions fit the situation*.

Now it is easy to say what a sympathetic critique of this view will be in Wittgensteinian terms:

It is not always the case that social traditions, or following the rules and norms of the day, that such *Sittlichkeit* can be “cultural” in Goethe’s sense. It is for example in the case of the hooligans not clear that the organization of the involved groups makes the clear sense Harré postulated. Take other social groups like Hells Angels or the students of this University.

It is not so clear what might be the various “positions”, roles and rules that certain individuals might develop and adopt within given social settings and what the “point” or “significance” of such positions might be. PT takes a right step in questioning the role- and rule following account of older forms of sociology, but it fails in that it regards “positioning” in purely *positive* terms. The possibility that “positioning” has to do with pretence, negative power, self deception, or weakness of the will, is not addressed properly. And that is where and why a more thorough Wittgensteinian account is called for.

So our final question is if the sort of therapy Wittgenstein advocated could be the adequate supplement to positioning theory? Can we, on Wittgensteinian conditions, maintain the micro sociological idea concerning the formation of position, roles, and rules within intersubjective intercourse? As I read Wittgenstein, the answer might be “yes” if only we adopt the following consideration: *We shall learn to see how individual people are always playing more language games at the same time, and that each of us, constantly, fuse and separate the different language games in ever new complex manners*. For instance, when I play with my children, I am not only engaging in the giving kinds of play. I am in another sense educating them, and protecting them, just as I make sure that their skills and their joy is visible to the mother, to the neighbours, or to themselves. What is more, I may play with the children in order to have a break from my studies, or because I want to make it acceptable that I am away all next week at an international conference, and so on. Now, the ways in which I can be doing all this, at the same time - all of what is contained in the single expression “playing with the children” - require that I adopt skills, experiences, memories, and a variety of Senses of Myself into my present activities. I must be able to fuse and

mix my being a man, a teacher, a scholar, a neighbour, a husband, a civilian, a Dane, ammo. And this mixing of all the different resources of my past life does not the least involve my emotional sides. It is so to speak my emotions that keep track of where I am, what I am doing, and where I am going. The emotions are the expression of the fact that it is *me* who is playing with *my* children. Or better, my playing with the children *is* an expression of the hopes, attitudes, aspirations, interests, or despairs of a particular person. I never become a United, integrated, self-clarified Self. The emotional features of my doings and my situation express in what sense this is not how, and who, I am. The emotions are in effect the authentic voices of a human life.

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