

Analysis and Interpretation of manuscripts 137 and 138

These are the manuscripts where Wittgenstein consistently inquires what characterizes "the dawning of an aspect". They are written during a long stretch of time (1948- 49) and follows up on the themes in the typescripts published as *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. Excerpts from the manuscripts are published as *Last Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*. What I consider a kind of abstract from the two manuscripts is published as Part Two of the *Philosophical Investigations*.

The focus of the manuscript is the *phenomenon* of a "dawning", the German term for which is *aufleuchten*. Accordingly it means some sort of flashing, lightening, or even flaming. Indeed, Wittgenstein is anxious to underscore the dramatic, surprising, and overwhelming character of the phenomenon at issue.

The awareness of, and deliberate response to, the phenomenon is also a focal point. "Is it associated with thinking or perception, or a mixture of both?" is a recurrent question addressed in the manuscript. Here, the focus shifts. Whereas the former issue ("what characterizes the dawning of an aspect") addresses a special phenomenon *as such*, the latter issue concerns the "shift" between two independently "established" forms of awareness, "now it is like this", "now it is like that". This latter issue obviously relates to the question of how the features and competences which are associated with independent, previously given, language games, enter into the enacting and awareness of the "dawning" to the effect that some *one figure* soon can be seen "like this", soon "like that". Indeed there are variations on the two issues in respect to many forms of vagueness (say, I can clearly see a rabbit in the figure but only with some effort also a duck).

Consequently, a third theme emerges concerning *what it is* that can soon be seen in one way, soon in another. Are we dealing with a special kind of "object" here? However, even if these themes are obviously addressed in the manuscript, in another sense, they do not make up what is "really going on" in it. One way to put this point would be to explain that the manuscript doesn't deal with *epistemological* issues in any strict sense. On the contrary, the effort seems to be to "embed" such issues within a broader anthropological, psychological, or cultural-historical perspective. Still, that would not catch the general drift of the manuscript.

The author is manifestly in a transitory phase. From the *Nachlass* we know that it is a phase that can be characterized as a transformation and supplement of the themes found in the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* into the themes of both *Remarks on Colour* and *On Certainty*. The main new thing in the manuscripts 137 and 138 is an analysis of various forms of make-belief (*Verstellung*). It is in this context that Wittgenstein carefully discusses a special phenomenon, that of "the dawning of an aspect". Before, in the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Wittgenstein had discussed a special "situation" (a limit to the possible awareness of a given person) characterized as "aspect blindness", and he had introduced the notion of pretence or make-belief. He had also associated the latter with a (if not THE) crucial notion of *privacy*, but there had been no consistent or systematic discussion of the issue.

One of the big points of the manuscripts 123 and 138 now seems to be that *when we deal with a proper case of "the dawning of an aspect", there is a limit to the possibility of pretence*. There may even be cases (also in relation to other kinds of phenomena) where pretence is *ruled out*. This point may be interpreted in a variety of directions. First it marks an interesting "new" kind of *necessity*, or at least modal structure within the intelligibility of human expressive action. Second, such kinds of phenomena reveal something interesting about certain crucial attitudes (*Einstellungen*) there may exist among people (attitudes "towards the other"). Third, this all indicates some very deep features of our human kind, our human form of life, the "natural history of mankind". In my view, Wittgenstein argues that the assessment of the phenomena at issue reveals a

set of so-called "life-expressions" (*Lebens-Äusserungen*), such as trust, hope, fear, bewilderment, anxiety, belief, certainty, and knowledge, to the effect that we not only single out precisely *those* life-expressions (as if we already knew what they contain or involve). On the contrary, the task of philosophy (it seems, according to Wittgenstein) is to present the characteristic features of a variety of phenomena - that emerge as part of our human affairs - *as an indication of HOW* the given kinds of life-expressions in a dynamic and elastic (plastic) way structure and spur our on-going affairs.

The transition of Wittgenstein's thought from 1947 - 50 can be said to move from a more "anthropological" view of 1947 to a more "historical" or even "evolutionary" view. The drift is not in the direction of epistemology. The themes concerning certainty in the texts of 1949-51 rather prolong the themes of 1948 and early 1949 on attitudes and what Wittgenstein consistently calls "patters in the carpet of life". Consequently, in order to initiate an analysis of the texts 137 and 138, I must go back and give a survey of themes and concepts found in the *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, i.e. the more anthropological remarks. Here there are, to begin, three basic perspectives on our human kind, or the human situation, that seems to be underscored by Wittgenstein:

1. Awareness (*aufmerksamkeit*)
2. Behaviour (*benahmen*)
3. Being Situated (*situation*)

Ad 1. **Awareness** as it is taken up by Wittgenstein is neither a special epistemological achievement nor a special feature of the "mind". You may call it by the English term "consciousness", but it is not an awareness of *particular experiences*, it is rather the very condition of "being minded" or "open" to certain features of Reality. The important thing is that "awareness" always comes in certain *forms* and is exhibited through certain *means* and *methods*. There are things and circumstances that can be "observed", "noticed", "described", "spotted", "pointed out", "detected", "demonstrated" *ammo*. *We find things out* and, as it were, put them on display. I find out something and is already, thereby, able to express *something* about *how* others, including myself, my find something similar, again (NOT how I actually found it out).

Ad.2. **Behaviour** here does not mean simply action nor acting in special ways. It means the general feature of human existence that we are always "onto" something, that we are trying things and wanting things and looking for things. We are "on the move" within our *lives*. It is like when we say "behave yourself!": it has to do with there being *manners*. These are not habits, norms, traditions and the like, they are more like natural responses, matters of course, and typical forms of conduct. You fall down and hurt yourself, I cry or laugh or show indifference. In any of these cases I "behave". It is not that we talk about a special dimension of "normativity" nor "value". We are not circumscribing an "ethical sphere". We are trying to say what characterizes the human being by contrast to other animals; they act, we behave! And this is "beyond good and evil", beyond religion, politics, and art. It is somewhat like the Sartrean notion of "flight"; of being able to move from one situation to another; you lie to me and I react, say, I forgive you or declare we are no longer friends. That *is what I do*; that is *Benahmen*, it is not an acknowledgement of the appropriateness or meaningfulness of what I do. What I do may be bewildered and confused. Still, it is, by contrast to the soldier who simply follows orders, a piece of "behaviour".

Ad. 3 **being situated**: Awareness and behaviour depends on circumstance and the overall background. In that sense we refer to a general aspect of human existence, that of "being situated" or "anchored" in Reality (physically, biologically, materially, culturally, psychologically, sexually,

politically, ethically, religiously, artistically.....). Here we have no Grande Meta Conception. We only (and that is quite enough) have the notion of a *whole and complex, yet specific*, situation (the "here and now state of affairs as to "how I find the world"). I am playing football (and not....). I am singing a love song (and not....). I robbing a bank (and not....). In short, this is where the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game comes into play. Whereas "behaviour" refers to our "form of life", "situation" refers to the state of affairs within specific, *possible (not actual)*, language games.

Now as I have argued elsewhere more extensively, Wittgenstein advances a "method" in the description of the specific "situations" within language games. He does so by means of distinguishing, quite systematically, between *three ways in which to assess "meaning as use"*:

1. sense of "meaning as use" : **Use** (*Gebrauch* in original German terminology)
2. sense of "meaning as use" : Utilization/**employment** (*Verwendung* in original German terminology)
3. sense of "meaning as use" : **Application** (*Anwendung* in original German terminology)

When I play football I use a ball, when I cook I use a pot or pan. When I make an excuse I use the word "sorry". These are instances of "uses". They indicate *specific moves in specific games*.

When I do arithmetic I **employ** the technique or algebraic operation "+". When I excuse myself I make use of the standard phrase "I am so sorry". In both cases, I "follow", "stick to", or "consult" a certain rule, table, scheme, form of instruction, exemplar, paradigm etc. I *make use-of* whatever are the adequate *expressions* for such rules, tables, schemes, paradigm, exemplars....Such "employments" may not, ontologically speaking, as occurrent events, be repeated; but *qua their adequate expressions or manifestations*, they can be said to be *done* times and again.

Its not that uses are tokens whereas employments are types. There are just different notions of tokens. So is the notion of "application". It is *whole language games that correspond to "applications"*. "application" concerns how specific games "runs", what is their point, their function, their relation to *other* games.

It is an important theme in the later Wittgenstein's writings (since 1934 I conjecture) that the same employments can have *different applications*, since the same techniques, habits, operations, procedures etc. may have different roles to play in different games. Say I count my books: since I plan to sell them, or because the Gestapo has ordered me to make a list they can use against me in Court. The most notorious example of "same employment, different application" is captured by the Motto; "all of the operations within mathematics must have applications external to mathematics, in order to count as *mathematical* operations at all", which is a big theme in the Remarks on the Philosophy of Mathematics.

As I have argued elsewhere, the important thing about making the distinction between use, employment, and application is that we hereby have a method or model for describing how a *set of different language games can be mutually entangled and enmeshed with each other*. What is a straightforward move, in one sense in one game, may be a strategic element in relation to another game to the effect that a third game, still, would have a certain point.

Now, in relation to the manuscripts 137 and 138 this gives us the following preliminary consideration: The dawning of an aspect is obviously an example of a **possible entanglement and enmeshment between different language games**. Not the least because of a very simple feature of the situation, namely that we have to do with *one item* (the "contour" or "figure") which is a piece-to-be moved, but moved differently, in different games. The same ball

can be used soon within a game of soccer, soon in a game of handball. The same item has different **employments** in different games. So consequently, there may be a **use** associated with the dawning of the fact that there are these two different employments; I may express surprise, astonishment, bewilderment, or joy in and through the experience of such dawning. To deal with something that *can* be a “puzzle” is a straightforward way of “opening up for” a number of certain kinds of experience. Accordingly, being a person who might want others to experience the kind of astonishing things that I have myself experienced; I may **apply** a guide to a specific instance of “the dawning of an aspect”. I invite and guide somebody by means of shifting between different **employments** of the same items in the hope that the other persons get the experience that the items at issue can be **so used**.

This is just *one* set of considerations that link the theme of the dawning of an aspect with themes and notions from earlier works. In order to grasp the importance of the text of the manuscripts 137 and 138, we have to point to both a) a systematic connection between the two concepts “*verstellung*” and “*verwendung*”, and b) the deeper features of the concept of “*Verstellung*” as indicated already in RPP.

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Pretence, Privacy and Teaching

First, let us note a deep link between teaching and honesty. If I try to teach you some rule governed forms of behaviour, I cannot be deceptive. I cannot both teach you have to add two complex numbers while, in some sense, misrepresenting or hiding something. *What I teach* is what you will learn. Consequently, to associate my behaviour with a series of “employments” is as such to indicate ways in which I have to be sincere. However, bearing in mind the distinction between employment and application, I *might* of course utilize certain techniques of performance in order to cheat you or conceal something from you. I can avoid the role of a teacher (avoid the role of a citizen who wants to share my abilities and skills with others). I can tear the link between social action and individual intentions apart. I can try to dissociate the possibilities we have in common from the projects I have on behalf of myself or I have on behalf of a selected group of people. *Verstellung*/make belief is one crucial way of doing this. Wittgenstein in one remark put it directly as follows: *Privacy means the possibility of pretence*. THIS is the main Wittgensteinian notion of privacy; I can, indeed, have my own “private” *application* of the common techniques. But only if I - in some odd way - make use of the in principle public, common social techniques. I must “go public” if I want to be private. Privacy is a form of *drama*, it is theatrical. It is not a kind of isolated contemplation nor introspection. I must perform in order to achieve some sort of privacy.

However, it is one thing that we *could* engage in pretence. But why should we? What are the temptations, drives, needs or reasons that move us in such a direction? Well, whatever they are, they are *personal*. I engage in something but I do not want my engagement to disclose *me*, who I really am, what I really care about and so on. I hide myself through my engagement, even if the latter is sincere enough. It need not be hollow in order to involve pretence. As such it is associated with privacy: My hiding myself in my actions seem to provide with a free space of personal choices; not that I become free to do anything at will, but merely that the space of possibilities are wider than they would have been - did I not enact pretence - and wider in a way in which only *I can survey*. “If only you knew!!” I can now have things up my sleeve you would never know!

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Last theme from RPP I will mention is the modelling of psychological phenomena: This subject in itself requires a whole book to analyze. But here the important thing is the way in

which *emotions* are integrated into different kinds of experiences and considerations. Emotions, like moods, color, intensify, and temporally structure our experiences. The complex entanglements within our experiences are spatio-temporally manifest in and through the emotions (*Gemütsbewegungen*). If I am angry about something, if I hope for something, if I long for something...then its is *constitutive* they endure and have spatial manifestations in distinct manners (f.i. that my lips are pressed together whenever I think about so and so, or that my hands shiver whenever I am approaching my boss.). So emotions are not the least what ties different language games together. *Emotions are as such the direct manifestation of the shift between use, employment, and application*: The careless spontaneous move, versus the deliberate next move versus the anxiety in stepping into a kind of action. The presence of my being situated is modelled by the connection between use, employment, and application.

Thus, the dawning of an aspect *must* come with a sense of surprise, bewilderment, astonishment etc. that is how *in this case* the emotions manifest the entanglement and enmeshment of language games.

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Survey of the most important themes of manuscripts 137 and 138

Since the continuity and organization of Wittgenstein's texts are what they are, it is not obvious how to "refer" to their main line of discussion and presentation. Consequently, a commentator has, herself, to reorganize and select what she takes to be the main thread and the sequence of sub themes and concepts to be highlighted. Thus, I will begin by making a list, a survey, of themes and concepts that shall be discussed further as I go along in my elaboration of Wittgenstein's text. I list them, almost, in the order in which they are formulated in the text

Interesse der Mitteilung

There is something called "the language game of telling something" to somebody else, Wittgenstein says. This (or the family of such) games is enmeshed into a variety of other games, and so there are a variety of means and forms in which to "share", "convey", "display" ammo. something with others. Later these games are associated with the notion of "interest". We should always ask which interest someone has in telling someone else something (by contrast to other expressions that are not necessarily associated with certain interests).

The eternal strife between "the picture of the meaning" and the tools of language

This is a quote (p.3 / 137) and the theme comes up in a number of contexts:

There is an issue about the **generation of pictures** in relation to the question of how, and how far, such generation can be dissociated from the established techniques of language (even if these make up a necessary background). You may call it the theme concerning the freedom within a given "atmosphere of imagination" (quote!!)

There is another issue concerning the **power and ability to generate pictures** (*Vorstellungskraft*) as a crucial ability in certain situations, and where there being such an outcome, there being a picture, is crucial (by contrast to other situations where "a picture holds us captive"). Pictures have both positive and negative roles.

Description of use (of concepts)

Here there are many sub themes, but the main themes are:

That description of use points to a **system** of uses/concepts/meanings

That description is associated with "**observation behaviour**"

That there is nothing called the **general** description of the employment of words (of *Verwendungen*)

That philosophy is NOT primarily description of use

That all forms of description come after some forms of expression

A thorough parallel between the connoisseur and musical ear (*Gehör*)

The main theme seems to be the possibility of "*Variation on a theme*", which again point to the power of Imagination, and which again points to the ability to restructure (shift, blend, cut, invoke...) whatever language games are involved in the formation of different kinds of awareness

How education and personal Formation can HINDER the exercise of certain attitudes and emotions, especially the ability for suffering

(This is perhaps the Main Theme of the two manuscripts!)

The idea is that discipline, rule-following, normative frameworks, however necessary in certain ways, may block and hinder certain crucial features of further communal life. It is more the whole culture that faces such regress than it is matter of the handicaps of an individual person.

Pretence (*Verstellung*)

We should learn that the following themes - when discussed in relation to the possibility of pretence - acquire a new dimension. This is to say, if we do not associate the respective notions with such a phenomenon as pretence, then we have not learnt see the notions as (using a term from the manuscripts) genuine "utterances of life" (*Lebens-Ausserungen*):

Pretence and trust / Pretence and employment / Pretence and duration (temporality) /
Pretence and Privacy / Pretence and uncertainty / Pretence and the DRAMATIC dimension of human affairs.

Insecurity towards others

This is the "default" attitude or factual condition of our lives. Thus, various ways of "making sure" - even though these ways will never succeed literally speaking - become crucial. And it turns both ways; I have to "read" the insecurity of the other in relation to me, and I have to help making myself clear (but only as clear as it takes to achieve this or that).

It is important to distinguish this, primary, insecurity (*Unsicherheit*) from the kind of certainties that are associated with *specific moves within a certain range of language games*. I can *try* to deal with such uncertainties, whereas I cannot deal with the "gap" between me and others. Here, I must accept and respect a gaps that can never, and should never, be filled.

Related to this is the following:

"The fine after-shadows of human behaviour"

How the understanding of others is mediated through a "reading" of the patterns of experience (including emotions) that surrounds their behaviour (behaviour cannot be dissociated from neither expressions nor the character and content of experiences).

A very important remark in this relation is this: "Die Aufmerksamkeit den Anderen wird anders gelenkt": My expressions and behaviour continuously "hook" the awareness of the other. There is here also a very significant theme from Goethe, what has been called the possibility of *Blicklenkung* (to learn to see connections between things one did so far not conceive as inter-related, not only of the duck-rabbit kind where two different things surprisingly are interrelated, or learning to see that particles and waves are related forms of physical phenomena; it is also a matter of learning to see, "say", "the potential mother in my girlfriend" or "the true person within my ph.d. supervisor").

The task of being able to "take on" the (natural) facts (of life)

This is a general, important theme, which can easily be looked at too narrowly

Recall: "*Die Tatsachen hinzunehmen*", a Quote („take in the facts“)

Recall: „*Das hinzunehmende seien Lebensformen*“; the original German Quote.

Here there are two levels of discussion

First level : A distinction (so to speak, in the terms of TLP, terms that the later Wittgenstein does not use, or in the terms of many German philosophers) between Reality and World. To "realize", or take in, the facts means to become aware that a WORLD is available as an stable and "operational" field for human agency. A World is a field of orientation and a platform for action. There is no

Reality BEHIND such a world. A world is a world FOR someone, though not in an epistemic sense. It is so to speak the fact that a world really is there, available for action that characterizes Reality.

Second level: Such a (temporarily) stable world makes it possible to “place”, “position”, “point out”, “distinguish” a.m.o. Note, here, all the examples of syllables within what seems to be epistemic notions, syllables that explicitly have connotations to practical operations: There can be *Fest-stellungen*, *Über-legungen*, *Fort-setzungen*, *Über-zeugungen*, *wahr-scheinlichkeiten*, *Empfindungen*, *Vor-stellungen* and so on:

In short, there is something called the Reality or “effect” of a series of possible actions and expressions that bring forth a kind of “stopping place” or circumscribed item; and so there emerges a variety of forms of HINGES around which different kinds of language games can turn.

It is not the least the possibility of distinct spatio-temporal manifestations of certain “positions” within certain language games that is crucial, though not only in the simple Strawsonian way (identification of individuals in space-time). But there is something called “this is how things stand”, “this is where we are at”, “this is how I find the world”. But the status of these declarations are *only* that they display a kind of certainty concerning “how to move on”. The declarations do not, as such, reveal “certainties” or justified beliefs, convictions, nor thoughts. I could have used the term “factuality” (that we find in Sartre), and say: There is a factuality within my endeavours that has (many) *applications* (employments with different applications)

Here a feature of VERSTELLUNG becomes crucial: Because pretence can be followed by confessions (*Ge-ständnis*). By confessing, I stand there, revealed, exposed....As such, this may imply many things, but the crucial thing is, and only is, that there is something called “getting on from this situation” (say, you confessed your infidelity, and *now* I respond to it and take my precautions. Confessions are also associated with the possibility of attaining certain attitude towards the other (*Einstellung*). Again, given how things “stand” I adopt my position towards these states of affairs.

The distinction between what suits and what fits a certain situation

“Mozart”, the name seems to fit the man and the music; but such forms of “fit” do not constitute the crucial thing; the ADEQUACY of making use of precisely that name in certain situations.

Perhaps the most important consideration here is the reminder that we should not try to assess human action (and utterances) in terms of how they fit rules, norms, traditions, schemes, and formula. So the *criteria* surrounding the rules, norms, and schemes are criteria of adequacy by contrast to rules for the fitting of things.

The temporality of experiences

Here we distinguish three themes:

That one should never ask what goes on WHILE we experience something

That temporal determinations are temporal acts WITHIN a deeper kind of DURATION

That time determinations (should) have practical purposes

The hardest thing (in philosophy):

To learn to express or present vagueness

Two themes:

- That one should learn to “live with” vagueness and indeterminacy
- That one learns to sense and respect vagueness in (most) contexts

The aging of authorship

The possible senses of an older work, and its elements, changes over time

The possibilities of expression are context dependent, here and now, and YET OPEN

The Revelation of the basic “utterances of life” (hope, fear, certainty, astonishment, knowledge...)

This is the ultimate, deep, task of philosophy. The point is to reveal WHAT IT MEANS (for example) “to know” by observing how the behaviour, expressions and experiences of people hang together (and not presuppose a general idea of “knowledge” etc.).

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What Wittgenstein is not doing:

In the manuscripts 137 and 138, Wittgenstein is not addressing certain well established philosophical issues for which there already has been given a number of tentative answers. He is not putting up alternatives to answers to questions about self-observation, 1. Person vs. 3. Person reports, rationality of actions, justifiability of beliefs, the determinateness of the sense of sentences, the possibility of proof or demonstration, or the balance between reasons, causes, and motives for action. He is not engaging in philosophy in that way.

I agree with the late Gordon Baker that it is strictly speaking wrong to ascribe to Wittgenstein *only* the view that philosophy is a kind of descriptive grammar. On my view there is no settled, given, established, ordinary, everyday, nor common way of conducting ones affairs. There is no home field, home ground, house, settlement, city, context nor natural surrounding the description (or saviour) of which is the primary goal of philosophy. There is no naturally given human form of life in any *existing* sense (no “this is how we are” nor “this is what we do”).

[And so there is no “cousin” to that view of philosophy, in relation to the German distinction between *moralität* and *sittlichkeit* (the former is the critical assessment of the latter, i.e. social critique vs. established norms. Wittgenstein is not a “critical” philosopher.)]

However, there is another kind of *modal* account of our human form of life. Parallels are Goethe, Kierkegaard, or Emerson; a different kind of *Portrait* of our human kind.

I disagree though with Baker and with a number of other interpreters like Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, Jim Conant, Danielle, Moyal -Sharrock, and especially John McDowell. I disagree with all these interpreters in that they, on my view, make *too much* of Wittgenstein as a philosopher of virtues, values, norms, conventions, rules, traditions ammo. I mean: they present Wittgenstein as a philosopher who produces a very special kind of writing to the effect that a distinctive contribution to social and ethical understanding is, in principle available, and only available, by such means. They present Wittgenstein as the author of a *non-historical* kind of writing, of a kind that, on their

account, paradoxically one might add, can still, and always, be useful and significant, whatever the given historical situation might be.

What Wittgenstein is doing

Consequently, what is missing, what these interpreters miss in the real Wittgenstein, is a deeper issue that must be associated with the one just mentioned; namely the issue of *reminding ourselves of elements of the real history of things*, say the problems within the development of mathematics, physics, religion, politics, the arts, the market (money, commodities), institutions, social structures and so on. Such historically given settings must so to speak be re-presented, not as historical settings as such, but as examples of something more general. We are close to the old German problem of learning to see the general in the particular (*allgemein*, NOT *generell*). Here, the interpreters by contrast stick to a poor phenomenology “about” our form of life, supplemented by a number of significant examples from literature (Henry James, Shakespeare, Joseph Conrad, Tolstoy, Iris Murdoch, Kipling, Dickens,...)

But WHY should we do this (German) thing about learning to see the general within the particular? Well one kind of answer, since Goethe and Hegel, points to an “encyclopaedic” approach. I conjecture that Wittgenstein should be put on the list of philosophers who advocate a kind of encyclopaedic understanding of philosophy. On such a view, philosophy is nothing over and above the distinct fields of experience and science, nor is it even a special, independent task, method, nor exercise.

However, the different fields of experience and expertise might, and should, learn from each other. Intellectuals and craftsmen of all kinds in *one special sense* face a common task; the task of not being *so special and isolated* that the respective kinds of expertise becomes irrelevant outside of a small circle of specialists.

Philosophy, Wittgenstein, is but a voice, a voice that implicitly calls for a special endeavour to the effect that no field of expertise becomes blind to the possibility of developing by learning from unexpected quarters and strange skills. This is not about cross-cultural understanding, the fusion of horizons, a language of perspicuous contrast and so on., it is an invitation and a partial guide for how to move on.

It is in this spirit that RPP contained, among other things, the reminder that there *could be a scientific psychology*. Or the remarks on Colour contains the reminder that we *could* have a different kind of expression in relation to colours.

Similarly, as Wittgenstein knew from Helmholtz, Hertz, Boltzmann and others, it took many efforts and developments of logic, language, technique, engineering, laboratory practice and mathematics in order to achieve a new kind of theoretical physics based on certain kinds of experimentation.

In physics, and *only in physics*, such a juxtaposition of skills is called a “principle”, i.e. The Principles of Mechanics. “Principles” means that there is a way in which the different skills and kinds of expertise can be made canonical. It means that the entanglement and enmeshment of language games can be demonstrated or expressed by means of schemata.

Wittgenstein’s encyclopaedic approach is Kantian in the following sense (and only in that sense):

If we can have no strict “principles” (in the sense of modern physics) in other fields of experience, then *what might the canonical expressions be* that display the kind of entanglement, enmeshment and going criss-cross that, in a crucial way, would *boost* the given field.

Recall, this encyclopaedic approach was only the first half of the story (of why we should learn to see the general in the particular). The second half of the story is like the ones we get from Diamond, Baker or Cavell: Our three-step approach is as follows: 1) We focus on a field of experience (the circumscription of which would take a long semi-Kuhnian account, or one along the lines of Harold Garfinkel), then 2) we re-present the issue in encyclopaedic fashion (“you can’t do physics without also doing”). It is all this that that finally, 3) can be applied in the fashion of our more ordinary interpreters, in the hope that we get a *richer understanding* of, say, physics.

However, here we should recall that the problem with Diamond and the rest is that our three-step exercise cannot be described as revealing something especially about *physics*. It is like learning that “being on vacation” means more than not having to work, but means also being together with relatives and friends, being in a state of restoration, or developing ones sense for adventure or foreign manners. Similarly, there is nothing in particular to learn, from Wittgenstein, concerning *ethics* (or any of the other given normative spheres). Learning to see ethical things right is learning to see ethical things *as significant for the broader human form of life*, learning - so to speak - to see “why moral issues matters”.

Baker is right about one thing: Wittgenstein deals with the question of how to offer to particular persons a kind of help that would further whatever problems and obstacles that person may happen to face. Wittgenstein does not address a “we”, although he in his address to the individual person many times refers to what “we” would say and do. Baker is also right in saying that the individual person that Wittgenstein speaks to is not always the common man in the street; he might be Einstein and indeed Bertrand Russell. A good guess would be that Wittgenstein had a special interest in innovative and creative people, pioneers or those that are “ahead” of the rest. Because, he thought, if they are *only ahead* of their Times, and have no other special character, they will soon be caught (quote): So, my conjecture is that Wittgenstein had a special interest in the kind of pioneer that was Not part of a special audience, representing a special kind of authority, or tradition. Such persons are interesting, not because they have stepped out from the group or the crowd, but because of the way in which it makes a difference once they get back in. in that sense, and only in that sense, Wittgenstein produces a therapy, he helps the potential pioneers out of a certain kind of crisis. He guides them in becoming aware of “how to move on” in a way that the previous conditions and background had blocked.

My example of someone that would exemplify all this would be John Lennon. He many times over asked himself, “what am I doing as an artist?”. First he wanted to be a skilled songwriter like Gershwin, then he wanted to be a skilled poet like Bob Dylan and others, then he wanted to be a producer (craftsman in the recording studio) of sound and moods, then a political writer and finally a self-confessing artist and so on. All these changing attitudes took place within one single enterprise of writing popular songs. Now, imagine Wittgenstein as a friend of Schubert or of Tolstoy. Imagine that he was writing FOR THEM, helping them as someone might have tried to help Lennon throughout his career. We know pretty much how Wittgenstein would have written for his heroes in literature. Now, just suppose that he wanted to write something *similar to the kind of pioneer* we were envisaging. Then we are close to the conception of philosophy that Wittgenstein might be said to have endorsed.

Considerations on the inter-relation of the main themes of the manuscripts

Vagueness, description and the specific modes of awareness

The remark on “the hardest thing in philosophy” is a suitable place to start; it says that the hardest such thing is to “express vagueness” (137, p. 71, p. 113). This is, as we have seen, a remark about the prospects of philosophy, but implicitly it refers to the subject matter of philosophy. I mean, as I read it, the remark does not express a humble attitude concerning the limited agenda of philosophy, as if we are saying, “philosophy can only...., and not”. The simple fact is that philosophy deals with something that is, in itself, full of “vagueness”. We are talking about a crucial feature of our human lives, and as such, philosophy must admit to itself that it cannot remedy the vagueness, and substitute it for “something better”, but this reminder hardly puts any academic limit to the possible tasks of philosophy.

The philosopher should realize that there are no “clear cases”, “clear examples”, “clear goals”, “clear methods”, “clear concepts” and so on. In philosophy we try to re-phase and reconstruct something that has its reality and significance elsewhere, so to speak. However, philosophy is not merely a series of comments and invocations from an external quarter. We should rather think of the philosopher as someone who stands in the middle of things, and *takes a break* (not holiday but break). Let me compare this to the “Stance” of Ilham Dilman in his great book *Love and Human Separateness*. Genuine love cannot transcend certain separateness. But genuine love can be characterized as *seeking* to “overcome” particular forms and instances of separateness. As such, seen as a “search”, love will forever fail in its explicit endeavours. However love remains genuine if it continues to involve trying to unite. Let us for the sake of argument allow that this is a fair summary of a basic part of Dilman’s book (it may be too simple). And add to this summary that we are all way through talking about “love” only in the sense of a continuing series of acts or efforts, and that we are talking about a certain set of attitudes that colour these acts. In that sense, we can say that “love is directed” towards maintaining a certain form of co-existence with another person. That a love is “genuine” here means that it consistently can be characterized as answering to the qualities we have just listed. There are none of the *particular* efforts that in and by themselves shows, proves, or demonstrates the genuine character of the loving person (this was the failure and tragedy of Othello). In short, here is a case, but not a “clear case” of what it means genuinely to love, and we realize the importance of learning to “live with vagueness”. “Vagueness is the hardest thing” because it first takes a kind of Shakespeare to express it, and second a kind of Goethe to assess (what Goethe called the “culture of experience”), namely the *worth of being reminded about so and so*.

In that sense, the philosopher “always already” - unless we deal with idle wheeling - address a certain situation where the entanglement and enmeshment of various (possible) language games implicitly blur, block, or distort an adequate understanding of something. Here we must distinguish four cases. First, it may be the participants that face bewilderment, a bewilderment of which they are either aware or not. Second, it may be the philosopher who faces bewilderment, with or without an awareness of this situation. I conjecture that Wittgenstein does not address the latter, fourth case. He only discusses the blindness and ignorance of abstract philosophical thought in so far as it, in given cases, *have an impact on the participants themselves*. This is why he discusses general lines of thought, modes of expression, or “traditional” distinctions, concept-constellations and “viewpoints”, but *never discuss the literal formulated text of any philosopher*. Accordingly, Wittgenstein is not trying to appear *as an alternative philosopher*, but rather as a *special kind of participant* in relation to a “bundle” of different forms of participation in the given cultural setting.

As such, his invocation comes “late” in the history of those he, in principle, addresses. There have been other co-participants, teachers, authorities, and others. So implicitly he deals with *them* as well. In that sense, the borderline between authenticity and pretence becomes important. *Wittgenstein* is not out to make belief. He wants to further some kind of sincere transformation or development of the given situations. He does not seek a special feature (clarity, honesty, truth,...) but a great *variety of improvements*. Indeed, “the possibility of improvement” is crucial. It is crucial for the kind of hope or optimism that Wittgenstein wants to bring forward, and it is crucial in the general depiction of “our human form of life” (and so in a very special sense, Camus was right in declaring that the first problem of philosophy was to overcome suicide; the spirit of philosophy is that there is always, some light at the end of the tunnel [who said Plato’s cave or Kant’s dark ocean?]. There is always some hope, whatever the misery, and thus an urge “to move on”. Wittgenstein prolongs the Kantian tradition of *Prinzip Hoffnung*.

We actually find in the manuscripts 137-8 sections on the notion of “hope” (137, p. 114-5), but it is the tight relation between the two notions of “description” and “improvement” that is fundamental (137, p. 81b). Now, there are other “marks” associated with descriptions, such as memory, comparison, efforts, and being precise, Wittgenstein remarks (*ibid.*) In that sense, “descriptions” form *a kit between the aspirations of a given person and the means for actually engaging in practical affairs in accordance with those aspirations*. “descriptions” are in themselves just one of the “tools in the toolbox”. They are just one kind of instrument in the production of representations, messages, declarations, reports *ammo*. But the *place and role* of descriptions is a mark for the interests, the ambitions, the aspirations, and other, similar kinds of attitudes that can be characterized as expressions of “hope”.

It makes sense to talk of the “place” of descriptions in that the production of them, Wittgenstein says, is associated with a kind of behaviour that involves noticing, observation, detecting and so on. So what is involved in the making of descriptions is those kinds of awareness (*Aufmerksamkeit*) where the participants are, literally speaking, noticing something (*Bemerken, Aufmerken, Betrachten, ...*) Here, as a result of such forms of observation, there emerges in principle a picture, a scheme, or a kind of *organized* representation of the objects at issue. And such organized forms of representation *can function as evidence*, even if they are not necessarily so used. They are so to speak markers for where to hang ones hat within the ongoing entanglements and enmeshments among a series of language games.

Here we should quote the remark “the kind of certainty (*Sicherheit*) is the kind of language game”. We are talking about the certainty directed towards other *people*, and thus *only implicitly* the manner in which one goes about certain items and states of affairs. However, this also means that the latter points back to the former, and so, for example, a careless behaviour towards a given item shows that this item is not of crucial importance in respect to certain interests and attitudes towards others.

Pretence, will, and behaviour

Enter the theme of pretence. Within the various forms of (what would qualify as) pretence, we find a number of carefully arranged patterns of behaviour in respect to certain items, facts, and expressions. The pretender is careful not to do and say certain things, and to actually say and do other things, including in both cases, an attempt to “link the awareness of the other” (137, p. 68). Consequently, the phenomenon (Wittgenstein’s term) of “the dawning of an aspect” is important in that there is a limit to how we can try to link the awareness of the other. I can guide and arrange and invite, but I cannot *hide and conceal* the dawning of another aspect than the one aspect I try to let dawn on the awareness of the other. Wittgenstein finds it important that it’s a matter of coming to *see* (and not observe) a new aspect to the effect that this new way of seeing something comes with a

notable astonishment. Wittgenstein would later, in Remarks on Colour (RC, III § 326), say, that “one observes in order to see what one would not see when one did not observe”. So “observation” is involved in the transformation from one way of seeing to another. However, the result of the transformation must be a way of “seeing”. Wittgenstein explicitly declares the importance of this: He notes that “seeing” is not an action in the same way as “interpretations” are (137, 35a). Interpretations are associated with “thoughts” whereas *seeing is associated with actions of the Will* (137, p.122-3, p. 136), or rather, the dawning of an aspect leads to a kind of seeing in that the sight that emerges may “run against the will”. The dawning of an aspect is correlated to certain actions of the Will, in the sense of there being effort, attempts, trials, arrangements and so on (138, p. 18). We are dealing with acts of deliberation, but such that have no definite, secure, outcome. There is so to speak a gap between the preparation and the outcome (in principle, a gap between the preparations of a teacher and a pupil) even if the dawning sometimes comes spontaneously.

So: Wittgenstein refers to what I call “the gap” by saying that seeing is not action, proper. It is not “essentially” associated with behaviour. And this brings us to the distinction “world”-“Reality”. For it is one thing that the dawning does not include “work on the surroundings” (not a quote but a reference to Wittgenstein’s constant use of the term *Umgebung*). No reorganization of, let’s call it, the field of action, takes place within the dawning. No displacement of the involved items takes place.

Occupations

Still, Wittgenstein says,

“Ich möchte sagen, dass dasjenige was hier aufleuchtet nur so lange stehen bleibt als eine Beschäftigung mit dem Objekt dauert.“ (137, 143)

(I could say that what dawns only remains as long as there is an occupation with the object)

Consequently, there is something called the “occupation” with the item (the item that one comes to see in a new way). There is a *Beschäftigung* (recall the German term for a store, *Geschäft* which has connotations, also in Danish, to the general intercourse among, or business between, people (*die Verkehr mit dem Andern*)).

This occupation with the item is a deliberate act which aims at preventing a “collapse” into a former view. It is an act within an “effort of creativity”. Still, the outcome - coming to see so and so - is not part of this occupation. But by contrast to the previous forms of *behaviour* that led up to the (new) occupation with the item, there is *no gap* involved. The, temporary, occupation *leads to* coming to see... And here it is crucial that the occupation *can only be* temporary, by contrast to behavioural activities. The latter are of course temporary in the trivial sense that they cannot last forever. I can help my children everyday, but not every second of my life. By contrast, the temporality of the occupation leading to dawns is essentially associated with the temporality of emotions (*Gemütsbewegungen*). As such, it is important that these moods and occupations *cannot be interrupted at will*. This is to say that if one interrupts them, then there has been a “collapse into former kinds of behaviour”.

[In the RPP Wittgenstein seems to make a distinction between various dispositions, attitudes and intentions that he does not invoke in these manuscripts, but one should bear these distinctions in mind nevertheless]

Within the dawning I occupy myself with the item, the item on which a new sight emerges, so to speak in a lifted spirit. I “enjoy” or “suffer” the revelation. The item is not just something I take notice of, detect, or report. I am soaked into it. I swallow it. It hits me. Compare with this case: I recall a remark made by someone and recall the circumstance and previous encounters with that person. Now it dawns on me, “he really admires me!” or “for Christ sake, he hates me!”. “He” thus becomes present to me in a sense that is much more overwhelming than being an object of careful observation. Wittgenstein compares such dawning with the dramatic shift in a story or the shift between major and minor keys in music. He uses the term “the cliffs of concepts” (*Begriffsböshungen*), where the former use of concepts slip and slide and everything is turned upside down.

I want to say; this is what *really* happens. It is the *Reality* of coming to see things in a different light. When we achieve that, our *World*, the field of action, the set of meaningful forms of behaviour, is reorganized.

An important occupation: The construction of a ruler and schemata

I have (since a dissertation on the subject in 1982) many times advocated a certain perspective on a part of Wittgenstein’s later writings. I have tried to underscore the significance of recognizing concrete marks, dots and strokes as belonging to what can be called “the signs of a language”. It is true, not the least since Kuhn, that philosophers have recognized that concrete items, according to Wittgenstein, belong to “the toolbox of language”. And so, there being paradigm, tables, schemes, exemplars and so on has well been recognized as forming an essential part of the use of a given language. However, it is, to me, not enough to consider such paradigms merely, as standards of comparison, standards of subsumption, or standards of recognition. Even if it is perhaps also true that many interpreters recognize such standards/paradigms as important “instruments” of the use of languages, the understanding of what this means is, on my view considered too narrowly. Let me, as a very special, but telling case; take a particular instrument of our common language, a *ruler*. A ruler is so to speak, the “paradigm of paradigms”. It is a means for comparison and thus for recognition and identification. As such it can be said to “fix” meanings, concepts, or objects.

The ruler also has another feature; it (we would like to say) fixes a “dimension”. It helps us to single out distances or lengths (and not colours, cats, or weights). It helps to fix, to keep stable a certain aspect.

Now we know from the TLP and on, especially on the background of the problems raised in “Some Remarks on Logical Form” of 1929, and the views presented in *the Big Typescript*, on (what I would call) the issue of “the mutual calibration” (or at least interdependence) between *the different kinds of logical structure* that is basic to different parts, and different kinds of application, of our language. The basic tables, schemes, rulers and system of concepts – that characterize different sections of our language – each in some way depend on the application of *other* structures among the concepts belonging to different parts of the language.

Be that as it may. I will not make a big, holistic point about it, or consider issues of “relativism”. I will, merely consider what it takes, in practical respects, to construct a ruler. [This issue is very, very important in itself, since it lies at the heart of the discussion concerning the foundation of quantum physics, which was the theme of my latest dissertation on Niels Bohr; but here I will only discuss the issue as a significant part of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy].

If you pick a small piece of wood and declare that this piece makes up a “unit”, you still cannot say in what sense two such pieces make up “twice” that unit, since you have, as yet, no criterion for what it means to *stretch* a piece of wood. Similarly, if you take a leaf and pile a series of leaves on top on one another, you still have no criterion for what it means that the pile is getting “bigger”, unless you have means for deciding *how* it gets bigger. That a ruler is associated with a

straight line and that the ruler indicates *the equivalence* of distances stands and falls with a *whole number of activities* that were related to the construction of the ruler. In itself the ruler is nothing. But the point is not only that these activities are presupposed. The big point is that the *activities can be fixed as interrelated to one another*, and that this fixation is possible because of a *special kind of production of symbols*, namely the strokes or dots on the ruler (think of all the apparatus in a physical laboratory, they are objects that are “full of symbols, symbols, which taken together, indicate a complicated pattern of mutually interdependent operations).

The construction of a ruler is, I believe, a kind of “occupation” by contrast to a kind of behaviour. It is preparation, not participation. Translated into the terminology of the manuscripts 137-8, the construction of a ruler corresponds to a series of employments to the effect that one generates a number of canonized pictures. Such a construction is a ready made item *for an open range of further application*. The idea of such a special kind of pictures, pictures that are generated by means of some procedure, is very close to the original Kantian idea of “schemata”. It is a well earned story from German post-Kantian philosophy that whereas the schemata of Kant’s First Critique are a kind of meaning-condition for a canonical (categorical) application of certain concepts, the schemata of the Third Critique are “symbols” in another, not so strict, sense [it would be too simple, here, to say that the former schemata are constitutive whereas the latter are regulative]. The “symbolic” character of schemata means that they are expressions of *how certain “subjective features” are embedded in the occupation with a certain item*. One such feature is (quoting from Niels Bohr) “knowing what you have done”. [Indeed I think that we can trace a historical line from Kant’s schemata to the truth-operations of TLP to both Bohr’s analysis of experimental arrangements in QM and the later Wittgenstein’s view on paradigms, but that is not what I want to point out here]

Occupations as operations and the modalities of pretence

The possibility of some experiences presupposes the discipline of some, previously performed activities. Let us call such disciplined activities “operations” (by contrast to the term “techniques” which we use specifically for “employments” answering to canonical explanations of the use of certain terms in the language.

The main theme, here, shall be: Suppose I have learned to apply a certain paradigm by recognizing the operations that makes such application possible. Now, to my surprise, I learn that there could be *other operations* surrounding the paradigm to the effect that the formerly meaningful application of the item must give way to a different kind of application [actually, in Bohr, it is (for instance) important that the item that we consider to be clocks should, in other circumstances, be associated with dynamical (and thus also spatial) notions]. Now in physics (and mathematics, and in science in general) this should be a case where the only problem that arises should be; “so how do these operations, so and so, lead to these possible applications, so and so?”. In that sense, the issue is strictly technical [in a sense which, deep down, even the operations within physics cannot be. The latest discussions within particle physics contain a dispute about what to count as “operations” in the first place (especially in relation to the question of which notion of “particle” the different quarters of physics are dealing with)]. Anyway, *outside* of such disciplined contexts, the question “which operation for which application?” has a further “subjective” dimension. Here the attempt to make operations canonical (or at least natural, obvious, or clear) must be regarded as a kind of *behaviour* of an instructor towards a kind of “pupil”. Consequently, the operations that carry further applications are, also, to be regarded as advices, information, norms, rules, instructions, or (say) warnings. And so we get the full package; the operations are integrated with attitudes, emotions, pictures, sensations, expressions, actions, and thoughts. The operations are only the operations they are because they point back to certain “patterns in the carpet of life”.

We thus return to the issues concerning the interrelation between honesty, authenticity, authority, and teaching: What I have been trying to do – by discussing the special kind of occupations that I called operations - is to underscore some kind of “anthropological continuity” within such occupations. When the occupation is about “learning to see”, and that allows neither interruptions nor re-organizations, and the emotions and other psychic features are immediate, and so on, *then there is a limit to how pretence is possible*. Now, here I do not simply repeat myself, for we have learnt that in another sense, any instructor *must conceal* something for the pupils. I want you to learn to use this item as a clock. I know very well how one could also use it as a ball, as a piece of jewellery, or a piece of garbage, or the sophisticated uses that Niels Bohr could envisage. In that sense I *direct the pupil* in a sense that means more than I try to teach him something *particular*. So it is not the character of the possible applications but the fact of there *being* such “directions” that matters. One might here use a term from Rom Harré: I am *positioning* the pupil. I not only teach him something, I instruct him how to *be a pupil*.

Consequently, some kind of make believe, and some kind of play acting must be involved even in the most sincere and disciplined intercourse.

And there is no point in asking “which kinds of play acting”, for that will open up for an unlimited, counterproductive regress. Instead – and this is where I think the notion of “trust” comes in – one should be able to trust whatever make believe is at issue. I deliberately say “trust the make believe” and not “trust the person”, for the point is *that the special kind of make believe, as such, can function as a hinge* around which other activities can be build.

False and real authority

Now, it is, I think, a general semantic point of the later Wittgenstein that it doesn't make sense to describe or classify the construction in terms of its further applications (“there is one thing of which we can neither say that it is, nor that it is not, 1 m long – the standard meter in Paris”, PI I, §50)). Wittgenstein adds that making this claim of course is not to ascribe to the particular item a peculiar quality, since it is only to point out its special role within a particular set of language games. Consequently, I can talk about the length of the yardstick if only I base this talk on the employment of other standards of description.

Our recurring theme: Both when saying “you cannot say” and “you can say” I am conscious about “not to confuse the technique with the picture”. I beware that the schematized application cannot be applied to the schematizing operation itself.

Now, by contrast to the make believe that is associated with trust, and which can accordingly function as a hinge, there is another kind of play acting which is part of trying fool your fellow beings, namely in cases where I wrongly present the fact that certain procedures make certain further applications possible as a special *reason for the application*, as if the possibility of arranging and preparing something in a particular manner tells what the particular item “really” or “truly” is. Thus a special kind of make believe involve “assurances”. Such assurances are different from the Bohrian “I know what I am doing”. The former kind are pretending to release a kind of license, “if you proceed like this...you are truly entitled to treat the product of your proceedings so and so.” Maybe we can call it “false authority”. By contrast, “real authority” is an expression of a negative attitude, by contrast to a false positive attitude. Real authority is when you can say, “if you do not follow me, like this, I am lost, and not because there is a special problem about me. It is just that I know of nobody who can possibly grasp what you would be up to”. [Here we reach the core of the “3. Person perspective: It is not a perspective over and beyond other perspectives; it is the perspective where whoever expresses it thereby appears to be just “anybody” (where the grammar of the will is dissociated from the grammar of intentionality you might say).

So the association of the technique with the picture resulting from the technique may be one way in which to enact pretence. In general this is a form of substituting the correctness of a thing with the adequacy or significance of the thing; a matter of substituting adequacy with some sort of "fit". As we have remarked earlier, this is indeed a major theme for Wittgenstein in the manuscripts 137-8.

The practical interest of time-determinations; episodes and their related emotions

Another major theme was the question of which "interest" is associated with a certain report, description, or declaration. We are told that there always is a *practical* interest and one crucial example is the practical interest we have in ascribing time-determinations to our experiences. Here we must distinguish "As" (I saw her, I realized how I missed her) and "when" I saw her I realized...". The latter case is indeed more specific [and what that exactly means is a big point we return to discuss shortly]. In the first case, we are supposed to be reminded of some connections (I knew her some time ago, I shared a certain kind and amount of experience with her, she did always say ...) my expression of my missing her display an attempt to connect the future with the past. In the latter case, one is supposed to notice the forceful, regretful, or otherwise striking fact that "the moment I saw her" I said to myself "I should have called her long time ago" or the similar. These are then two different kinds of practical interest associated with the expression of time-determinations. In the former case I express my interest in not forgetting the past, in the latter case I show how my strong feelings for her remain.

Here a new set of questions pop up: It may be the case that some kind of interest excludes another to the effect that we shall also say that different kinds of time-determinations mutually exclude one another. I cannot both display my interest in kissing her right here and now and my interest in being friends with her many years from now, for there is a sense in which the expression of the former goes against the expression of the latter (and here "going against" means "as experience tells us" in relation to the carpet of life, not that it is logically excluded).

However, there *is in itself* a temporal character related to the possibility of turning from one kind of time-determination to another. This is where the notion of "duration" comes in, and with it the notion of "emotion": In the case where I adopt the attitude that I will see the girl in the future, The MIX (by which I mean the continuity, the blend, and the priority of certain sensations, perceptions, pictures, thoughts, feelings, moods, recollections, facial expressions, gestures, "posings", and reactions, indeed all the items from the catalogue of psychological phenomena as listed in RPP), such a MIX in a given case is different from the MIX of another case. We capture this difference with the invocation of the notion of duration. The various elements endure in different ways in the two cases. Note the contrast between "I hope to see her sometimes again" and "I want her here and now". For instance: here the pictures I form of her, and how they appear within my awareness, one by one, or repeatedly, may be very different in the two cases.

That – call it an *episode* in someone's life – is a real, occurring phenomenon. It "takes time and takes place". It "takes" stable things that endure. This is a shorthand for saying that the co-operation of the different elements of psychological phenomena (sensations, perceptions ...) is associated with duration and stability to the effect that it, in principle makes sense to ask, *how* do you experience the world in a given case. This is again an indication of the fact that bodily activity and verbal expressions are full blown features of psychological phenomena. In my terminology I want to say: The reality of episodes is prior to the character of the distinct elements within psychological phenomena. I mean; no element of a psychological phenomenon (experience), say a thought or a perception should be treated as an concurrent item, as such, in isolation from the entire episode. In particular, it should not be treated as if it it was causally related to *other elements* within

the episode. We should instead recognize a complex, temporal part-whole relation, by contrast to a multifactor causal connection.

Therefore: Never ask “what is happening while we entertain experiences”. What happens to me while I experience something is, as such, irrelevant (which is the specific fault of William James in respect to psychology and the general fault of most forms of epistemology since Descartes and Locke introduced epistemology as some sort of philosophy of mind).

Now, the Kantian schemata of the First Critique were supposed to express “time-determinations a priori”. They served the practical interest of providing a foundation for the science of mechanics. We find a notorious example of trying to formulate time-determinations, a priori, in respect to the fundamental features of our Human Being in Heidegger’s *Being and Time*. But now that we have been reminded [by Helmholtz, Hertz, Boltzmann, Planck, Heisenberg, and Bohr] how to make symbolic schemata operative on a more mundane, instrumental level, the question is the following:

Can we repeat the exercise concerning “schema in the form of time-determinations” in respect to psychological phenomena? Consequently, what I have been discussing above may be said to contribute to the foundation of a “rational therapy” where individual people are “analyzed” to the effect that the possibility for the occurrence of [a series of] certain kinds of “aspects changes” within the lives of those who entertain the therapy is “promoted” (made available). For instance, how can we guide someone in going from, say, “forgetting her”, to “remembering her”, to “missing her”, to “wanting her”, and finally to “talking with her”? Recall, the issue should all along be that of becoming aware *how* such successive “practical interests” might follow one another in somebody’s life.

The historical character of the possibility of suffering

This brings us to two further themes of 137-8: Wittgenstein thought that the way we influence and educate one another, in our modern times, blocks our original capacity to “suffer”. We are supposed to “be happy” about the ways things are going in all respects. We are supposed to be satisfied in too many respects. HOW can we change this state of affairs? How can I learn to “suffer” as I still want to pursue my job, my call, as a philosopher, or my role as a father and neighbour? How does happiness, well being, satisfaction, self assurance, self reliance and so on relate to suffering? How can there be a *practical interest* in suffering that makes the phenomenon transcend a counterproductive *Welt-Schmerz*? How could I learn, to want, to go “the hard way” in life (as Wittgenstein, according to D.Z. Phillips, expressed the issue), and not just want that things come easy?

So a text, say one of Kierkegaard that deals explicitly with suffering may be beyond the intelligibility of a recent reader. And Kierkegaard’s works may have become impotent in respect to expressing the excitements of modern adults that have evolved since his death. But of course, a particular reading, a deliberate miss-reading of some sort, may be able to do better. Which raises the question (that we find in Stanley Cavell) if certain, older texts were written deliberately with such a special perspective in mind, where the texts offers itself as a standing voice which can become a partner within a dialogue in many different ways over the years. As such the text then can be said to express a special perspective on perfectionism, on progress, on therapy, or on cultural history.

The idea of “a philosophical investigation”

Was this, and why was this, an issue that Wittgenstein was interested in, although he did not pursue it, as Cavell later did? Well, the obvious answer is that Wittgenstein wanted his philosophical writings to have a sort of long-lasting effect, so that they were not just a comment on a given

historical condition in the modern intellectual world. Thus, we ask, how his works can be conceived if this trans-historical interest was the ambition?

I have already given part of the answer by saying that he did not care to discuss individual writers, works, traditions, and philosophical meta-subjects. He instead tried to “cover what was in the tool box” of current philosophical-academic thought and tried to develop a “broad” view on the whole lot, without formulating a strict method or approach. One *could* say that the phrase “investigation” in the recurrent superscript “philosophical investigations” was carefully chosen. Within the philosophical tradition the major works have been presented as a “dialogue”, a “meditation”, “an “essay”, a “treatise”, a “Critique”, a “phenomenology”, a “letter”, and an “investigation”. The first case of the latter kind of work, that I know about, is Schelling’s work from 1809 on Human Freedom (*A Philosophical Investigation into the Essence of Human Freedom and the Objects that relate to this Freedom*). We also have works from both Husserl and Frege called *Logical Investigations*. Now, a constant theme in German Idealism and post-idealistic works is the idea that it belongs to the essence of our Human Being that we are “searching” and that we are always “disturbed” by that search. A constantly used metaphor from the early Schelling and Hegel to Heidegger and Sartre is the notion of a “center of disturbance”. The Human being carries, and carries with it the eternal disturbance. Presumably, Schelling introduced the idea of a philosophical *Unter-Suchung* in order to address the question of how to assess this crucial feature of our human kind. Philosophy is the search beyond the immediate forms of search, the movement beyond all forms of unrest, the new beginning for forthcoming endeavours. [Recall the characterization of love as a similar “search”, that is why love, including love of God and love of Nature, is the fundamental human drive and capacity].

I used the term “bewilderment” in order to portray the general human condition, as I believe Wittgenstein saw it. So – if we play the game of trying to make historical sense of the phrase “philosophical investigations” - we can say that his philosophy is supposed to be the confusion beyond all forms of bewilderment; which is to say that it is the unrest that drives us to go criss-cross in the labyrinths of language, or to go back and forth from the various outskirts of our city of language games to its centre. Philosophy is likened to the endeavour of learning to know a whole, new city by actually learning to live there and to be able to unfold oneself in any of the districts of the city. If this endeavour can also be seen as a way in which people find their feet in the “carpet of life”, i.e. as a general account of (life)experience, then we may glimpse the point of the phrase “philosophical investigations”.