

Emotion, Self, and Identity

24.25 and 26. May 2007, University of Aarhus

Programme:

Thursday 24 May

12.45-13.15 REGISTRATION

13.30-13.45 WELCOME ADDRESS by Steen Wackerhausen (Research leader for the research cluster 'Knowledge Society', Faculty of Humanities, Aarhus University) Anders Moe Rasmussen and Anne Marie Pahuus (Organizers and coordinators of the research programme Emotion, Knowledge and Culture)

13.45-15.00 PLENARY LECTURE I
John Deigh – *Emotions and Values*

15.00-15.30 COFFEE BREAK

15.30-16.45 PLENARY LECTURE II
Robert C. Roberts - *Generosity and Gratitude*

Friday 25 May

9.30-10.45 PLENARY LECTURE III
Margot Lyon - *The place of emotion in the embodiment of social life and implications for understanding action and agency: Lessons from early philosophical biology*

11.00-12.00 DISCUSSION:
WHAT IS THE ROLE OF EMOTION IN SOCIAL PROCESSES? (RESPONSIBLES: ANNE LINE DALSGAARD, POUL PODER)

12.00-13.00 LUNCH BREAK

13.00-14.15 PLENARY LECTURE IV
Jesse Prinz – *Emotion and Moral Identity*

14.15-14.45 COFFEE BREAK

14.45-16.00 PLENARY LECTURE V
David Cockburn - *Emotion, expression and conversation*

16.00-17.00 PANEL DISCUSSION (KEY-NOTE SPEAKERS)

17.15-17.45 'EMOTION, KNOWLEDGE AND CULTURE' BUSINESS MEETING

19.00 CONFERENCE DINNER
(RICHARD MORTENSEN STUEN, UNIVERSITY OF AARHUS, NDR. RINGGADE 3)

Saturday 26 May

10.00-11.15 PLENARY LECTURE VI

Kathleen Higgins - *The Spirituality of Music: An Emotional Exploration*

11.15-11.30 COFFEE BREAK

11.30-12.15 PARALLEL DISCUSSIONS

BELIEF AND FACT IN EMOTIONS?	WHAT HAS PHENOMENOLOGY TO DO WITH EMOTIONS?
RESPONSIBLE: PETER STORM HENNINGSEN	RESPONSIBLE: THOMAS SCHWARZ WENTZER

12.15-13.00 LUNCH

John Deigh (Texas/USA, ANU/Australia) <http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/profile.php?id=deighj>

Emotions and Values

The paper is about the relation of emotions to values. Some philosophers--David Hume, for instance--hold that our perception of objects as having value, positive and negative, consists in our feeling pleasure or displeasure at the sight of those objects and then projecting our feelings onto the objects. In holding this view, they oppose the line of philosophers going back to Plato who hold that the values we perceive objects as having are real qualities in the objects and not figments of our feelings and that the emotions we feel toward objects are responses to those qualities in the objects. After critically examining Hume's ideas, I consider how the view that goes back to Plato can be maintained without introducing the metaphysical extravagances it is generally thought to entail.

Robert C. Roberts (Baylor University/USA)

<http://www.baylor.edu/philosophy/index.php?id=001942>

Generosity and Gratitude

Generosity and gratitude are socially complementary virtues. As an emotion, gratitude is a proper response to acts of generosity, a response whose intelligence takes up the logic of generosity in an

appreciative perception; and generosity is “gratified” by a grateful response, not as a strict need, but as a fitting completion. The two virtues share a particular “ethic” or view of the social world, with implications for perceptual and judgmental evaluation of interpersonal situations and the actions that go with these.

Margot Lyon (ANU/Australia) <http://arts.anu.edu.au/AandA/people/visitors.asp>

The place of emotion in the embodiment of social life and implications for understanding action and agency: Lessons from early philosophical biology

The paper investigates the implications of a social approach to emotion for questions of embodiment and agency--and therefore being and identity. It uses work of Plessner (with mention of some other scholars in early philosophical anthropology/ philosophical biology) as well as some contemporary social theorists of emotion, to raise questions about action and agency.

Jesse Prinz (North Carolina/USA) <http://philosophy.unc.edu/prinz.html>

Emotion and Moral Identity

It is sometimes suggested that moral disagreements merely reflect differences in factual beliefs. On this view, when people share the same moral values, and would come to resolution if they could come to agree about the non-moral facts. An alternative view, which I defend, is that moral disagreements stem from different fundamental moral values. Such fundamental disagreements are possible because moral values are based on emotions, and emotions are amenable to cultural conditioning. Once our values have been formed in this way, they become integral to our sense of identity. I review empirical evidence for these conclusions.

David Cockburn (Lampeter/UK) <http://www.lamp.ac.uk/philosophy/dac.html>

Emotion, expression and conversation

The paper is an exploration of the place that the bodily and linguistic expression of emotion has in our lives; and of the connection of that with the place that emotion has in our lives. Emotion and its expression resist placing within traditional mind-body dualism, within belief-desire psychology, and within standard views of the place of language in human life. We see this in two strands in Descartes’ thinking: the radical lack of connection between emotion and behavioural manifestations, and the idea that to experience a situation through an emotion is to experience it in a confused way. In contrast with this, we see the sense in which we may, through its expression, have

unmediated recognition of another's emotions by reflecting on the place that these different forms of expression have in our relations with each other. It is crucial to this place that different people may manifest in their speech or bodily expression what strikes me immediately as the same emotional reaction to a situation. It is important, too, that expression has a two way relation to its context: on the one hand, what I see in her, or hear in her words, may immediately strike me in a certain way, and, with that, may clearly suggest a context of a certain form; on the other, knowledge of the context may play a crucial role in what I see in her. Focusing on a central form of linguistic expression of emotion: what someone speaks about, and the ways in which she speaks of it, may embody a certain picture of how things are. It may be through such articulations that I come to acknowledge that this is the way in which the situation is to be understood; and much that is naturally spoken of as 'conversation' involves attempts to engage with each other's articulations. Clarification of these relations, and, in particular, of the way in which speech is a form of contact with another, casts in a fresh light the familiar observation that there are many emotional states that can only be ascribed to one who possesses a language.

Kathleen Higgins (Philosophy, Austin/Texas)

<http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/profiles/Higgins/Kathleen>

The Spirituality of Music: An Emotional Exploration

I will consider spirituality as involving a number of features, including: 1) situating oneself in a larger context; 2) promoting a feeling of wholeness; 3) provoking the desire for external expression; 4) involving the enchantment or re-enchantment of our experience; 5) being geared toward growth; 6) providing an orientation in leading one's life; and 7) offering meaning. All of these features are emotional or closely related to emotion. I will argue that music lends itself to supporting the emotional conditions associated with spirituality. In particular, music underscores the dynamic aspect of spirituality, its being geared toward growth and further experience. I will argue that much of the meaning that people find in music depends on its temporal unfolding; for this reason, I think the tendency to associate music and emotion with discrete emotions is misguided. Whether or not there are individual affect programs for distinct emotion types, certain physiological aspects of emotion (as phenomenologically registered) are often consistent with a number of types, and the ambiguity reflects the openness of present emotional experience. Its ultimate significance depends on how it develops – how it relates to on-going emotional tracks – and it can be analyzed in discrete emotional terms only post hoc and in a highly reductive way. In this respect, music offers a

provocative rendering of the spiritual condition, with its characteristically open and unbounded stance.

Discussion leaders:

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PETER STORM HENNINGSEN